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ABSTRACT
POPULAR ATTITUDES TOWARD 
FREE MARKETS IN
TURKEY, IRAN, FORMER SOVIET UNION 
AND THE UNITED STATES
AYGUL OZBAFLI 
MASTER OF ECONOMICS 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Nader Habibi 
July 1997
In order to find v\/hether the major obstacles to the success of free markets are 
“the attitudes, morals, and understandings of the people themselves, not just the 
institutions or policies they live with,” Robert Shiller, Maxim Boycko, and Vladimir 
Korobov (1991) conducted surveys of randomly selected individuals in the Soviet 
Union and in the United States. The same study was repeated in Iran by Nader 
Habibi (May 1995). The goal of this thesis is, using the same set of questions 
that Shiller et al. (1991) used, to collect data on popular attitudes toward free 
markets in Turkey and compare the results obtained from this survey analysis 
with those in Iran, former Soviet Union and the United States.
Key Words: Economic psychology, economic development, market reform.
Ö ZE T
TÜRKİYE, İRAN, BAĞIMSIZ DEVLETLER TOPLULUĞU 
VE AMERİKA BİRLEŞİK DEVLETLERİ’NDE 
SERBEST PİYASA EKONOMİSİNE KARŞI
TUTUMLAR
AYGÜL ÖZBAFLI
YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, İKTİSAT BÖLÜMÜ 
Tez yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Nader Habibi 
Temmuz 1997
Serbest piyasa ekonomisinin başarılı olmasını engelleyen faktörler sadece ülkedeki 
kurum ve politikalara mı bağlıdır yoksa insanların tutumlarının da bir etkisi var mıdır? 
Bu soruya yanıt bulabilmek için, Robert Shiller, Maxim Boycko, ve Vladimir Korobov 
(1991) New York ve Moskova’da anket yaptılar. Aynı çalışmayı Nader Habibi (Mayıs 
1995) Tahran’da uyguladı. Bu tezde bizim amacımız, Türkiye’de serbest piyasa 
ekonomisine karşı olan tutumlan anket yöntemi ile ortaya çıkarmak ve bunlan İran, 
B.D.T. ve A.B.D.’dekilerle karşılaştırmaktır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Ekonomi psikolojisi, ekonomide gelişme, ekonomik reform.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The objective of this thesis is to survey the attitudes (towards free markets) of 
urban citizens in Ankara, and compare the results with the findings of similar 
surveys in Iran, the former Soviet Union and the United States.
Robert Shiller, Maxim Boycko, and Vladimir Korobov (1991) conducted surveys 
of randomly selected individuals in the Soviet Union and in the United States. 
The same study was repeated in Iran by Nader Habibi (May 1995).
The main purpose of Shiller et al. (1991) research in the former Soviet Union and 
the United States was to find out whether “the Russians and Americans were 
inherently different in their attitudes toward free market and private enterprise.”  ^
Because the Soviets lived under a communist regime for a long time, it was 
widely believed that the Soviet attitudes toward free markets were different from 
those of Americans who successfully adopted a free market economy. A 
widespread argument was that “the general public in the Soviet Union is not 
prepared to accept and fully use markets.However the results of Shiller et al. 
(1991) showed that the Soviet and American respondents actually held similar 
attitudes. This implied that the attitudes of the people would not be a barrier to 
the success of free market reforms in the Soviet Union.
Habibi (1995) repeated the same survey analysis in Iran and compared the 
results for Iran, USSR and USA. “The survey results for Iran showed that most 
Iranians have negative views on the consequences of free price movements.’’^  
He therefore, suggested that before government’s role in the economy is 
reduced, the public should be educated on the importance of price mechanism 
for efficient resource allocation.
It was also pointed out in Habibi (1995) that “learning about the differences in 
market attitudes not only helps resolve the debates on the role of cultural and 
social differences in economic development, but it can also speed up the 
implementation of reform programs by helping policy makers predict the potential 
public reaction to various policy reforms.’“'
Governments often fail to adopt some very beneficial policies. Most of the time, 
the reason for their failure is the resistance the proposed reform receives from its 
potential “victims.”
The institutional setup, which consists of formal as well as informal rules (e.g. 
cultural beliefs, conventions etc.), provides the constraints for organizational 
behavior. According to Douglass North®, “institutions are the structure that 
humans impose on human interaction and therefore define the incentives that, 
together with other constraints (budget, technology etc.) determine the choices 
that individuals make that shape the performance of societies and economies
over time.” And, he claims that "the constraints imposed by institutional 
framework , together with other constraints, define the opportunity set and 
therefore the kind of organization that will come into existence.”
Given the organization’s objective function and its institutional framework, the 
organization tries to acquire skill and knowledge that will put it ahead of its 
competitors. These acquired learning and skills together with external changes 
in the environment form the sources of change when perceived as opportunities 
by entrepreneurs.
The entrepreneurs perform a cost/benefit analysis in deciding to continue 
operating within the existing institutional framework or spending resources to 
change that framework.
Overall, the process of change is very incremental because the formal rules 
together with the informal constraints bias costs and benefits in favor of choices 
consistent with the existing framework. Therefore, the larger the number of rules 
to be changed, the greater the number of losers and hence opposition.
The political and economic organizations that evolved as a result of the 
institutional set up have an interest to reinforce the existing framework. As a 
result, the interest of the existing organizations produce path dependence. If
somehow the power of existing organizations is weakened, this might give rise to 
organizations with different interest and as a result eventually change the path.
The specific institutional constraints dictate the opportunities available to 
organizations. if organizations channel their resources and efforts to 
unproductive activity, it is because the institutional constraints have encouraged 
such activity. Hence, the source of poor performance is the underlying 
institutional framework. To direct organizations along a productively increasing 
path, their decision makers must find ways to restructure the institutional 
framework and to redirect incentives in the right way.
Popular attitudes and beliefs play an important role in the process of institutional 
change. Together with other factors, they affect the evolution and persistence of 
diverse institutional frameworks. Differences in the institutional framework of 
different societies can be a result of diverse attitudes and beliefs.
If a reform is falsely perceived as being inferior to the existing framework by the 
majority of the people in a country, resistance forms towards this change. 
Eventually, this might slow down if not stop the adoption of some efficiency 
enhancing policies. This was clearly demonstrated in a study by Hans Aage 
(1991). He was able to show that “adverse popular attitudes, ranging from 
popular misconceptions to genuine dilemmas and conflicts of interest, are a 
major brake on perestroika.”^
Resistance to reform, when caused by adverse popular attitudes and 
misunderstanding of the consequences of the proposed reform, can be 
somehow corrected using educational programs directed towards informing the 
people about its potential benefits. It is therefore important that, before 
implementing a reform, the popular attitudes toward the related proposal is 
revealed and analyzed. Usually, the easiest and sometimes the only feasible 
way of performing this analysis is through survey implementation. When 
conducted properly, survey research is a method of social research by which 
valuable data are collected, organized and analyzed.
Historical Background
Before presenting the comparative results, I would like to provide some historical 
background that have shaped the attitudes towards free markets in Turkey.
Previous failures of economic reforms contributed significantly to the pessimism 
among the Turkish citizens. Each time an economic policy failed, in order to 
correct for malfunctioning of the economy the government intervened and the 
State was given a larger role in the process. Turkish people, therefore, 
developed the attitude that in case of any type of economic failure the 
government should step in to correct for the failure. Nowadays, whenever some 
entrepreneur raises his prices for example, it is not surprising that Turkish 
citizens blame the government for not imposing enough controls on the private 
businessmen. Throughout this section, we want to demonstrate, giving specific 
examples from the past, how the roots of today’s resistance to free market 
economy in Turkey lies in the policies followed by previous regimes which mostly 
supported the idea of State as the main player for economic development.
II. ORIGINS OF ECONOMIC ATTITUDES IN TURKEY'
“Etatism”® is a term that is widely used to describe the political economy 
associated with the later Atatürk period. It stands for strict centralization in 
economic as well as political situations. Even though the Turkish republic initially
adopted relatively liberal economic policies, in the 1930s the state started to 
actively take part in decisions related to finance, industry, and foreign trade. This 
change in position \was basically attributed to previous failures with liberal 
experiments as well as the world economic crisis.
The liberal economic policies followed previously were not successful in 
delivering the expected rapid growth in income and industrialization. This lead 
the ruling Republican People’s Party (RPP) to seek a solution for industrial 
development that would allow the state to have a larger role in the process. The 
Kadro group (formed within the RPP) being influenced by the economic structure 
of the Soviet Union, considered state ownership as a permanent feature of the 
economy and looked for an alternative to capitalist and socialist ways of 
development. At that time it appeared to be sensible to adopt “etatist” policies. 
The idea of state as the main player for the industrial development was even 
supported by the conservative group with spokesmen such as Celal Bayar (who 
later became the president under the liberal regime of Menderes in the 1950s). 
Hence the idea of State as the “savior” of Turkish economy was implanted in the 
minds of Turkish citizens. This idea, which was supported by almost every 
regime afterwards, had a significant impact on how people thought of free 
markets as well as the changes brought by such a mechanism.
In this period, two five year industrialization plans concerning import substitution 
were instituted. The first, initiated in 1934, focused mainly on consumer goods
industries with some development in mining. The second one, had it been 
implemented, would have given priority to production of investment and 
intermediate goods with more weight placed on infrastructure. Under the first 
five year plan, the state had 20 factories built. The control of these factories 
were given to two financial institutions: Sümerbank formed in 1933 and Etibank 
formed in 1935.
Ruling administrations in Turkey have always been protective of agriculture. In 
the 1930s most agricultural income was freed from taxation. In response to 
falling commodity prices, the Soil Products Office (Toprak Mahsûlleri Ofisi, TMO) 
was founded in 1932. One of this organization’s duties was to set floor/support 
prices for wheat. As a result of protective policies followed in this period, 
landholders’ economic power substantially increased and a large amount of 
wealth accumulated in agriculture. In order to gain the political support of 
powerful land owner as well as the large portion of the population who were 
involved in agriculture, the regimes made policy concession to the agricultural 
sector. Because of these protective policies people were made to believe in 
government-controlled prices in the agricultural sector.
With the Second World War it became apparent that Turkey was economically 
and politically weak. It had to rely extensively on foreign aid to survive. During 
this period, the Turkish economy contracted at an average rate of 6.4 percent.
The largest fall was observed in agriculture. In industry, and specially in the 
public sector, production was set to meet the needs of war.
Uncertainties created by the 1942 Varlik Vergisi (wealth tax) hurt the private 
sector investment a lot. This tax fell particularly on private enterprise belonging 
to non-Muslim minorities and therefore it resulted in their emigration from the 
country. This situation demonstrates how uncertainties related to property rights 
can lead to adverse attitudes toward private investments and therefore hurt 
economic growth.
By the end of the war, it was obvious that policy making need to be released 
from etatism. The RPP won a majority in the 1946 elections, but the success of 
the newly created Democratic Party revealed the extent of discontent with the 
RPP policies under etatism. Disagreement was even stronger in the rural areas. 
Landholders asked for less intervention in agriculture. Similarly, people were not 
satisfied with the situation in commerce and industry. In 1948 during an 
economic conference planned by the Istanbul Trading Association, the 
participants proposed a step-by-step removal of etatism.
In response to these wishes, the İnönü regime initiated a development plan in 
1947. In this plan, the private sector was to have priority in the economy and the 
public sector would be limited to investments in infrastructure and social 
services. Agriculture was still emphasized in the plan. This plan was never
realized because of the RPP’s downfall in the 1950 elections. It did however 
contain all the policies prevalent in the Menderes regime during his first term in 
office.
During 1950-53 real GDP reached average annual growth rates of 14.6 percent. 
At this time, proposals were promoted to denationalize cotton and woolen textile 
mills and end state involvement in cement, bricks and beer production. Even 
though these proposals were not put to life in large extent, the private sector’s 
performance in industry and agriculture was relatively well.
Unfortunately, Turkey’s first post-war experiment with liberalization lasted a mere 
four years. Agriculture suffered from the unfavorable weather conditions in 1954 
and resulted in a 2.8 percent decline in real GDP. The government responded to 
this by introducing import restrictions. And eventually in 1958, the Menderes 
regime had followed a completely different strategy and established quantitative 
restrictions on trade through quotas.
Only a small portion of the proposals for greater private ownership were 
implemented. In 1951 ownership and control of the State Maritime Lines had 
been given to the Denizcilik (Maritime) Bank.
For the following ten years, government spending on investments in 
infrastructure, agriculture support prices and subsidies for the State Economic
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Enterprises (SEEs) far exceeded revenues. This resulted in large budget deficits 
which were financed by foreign borrowing and deficit spending. Therefore, in 
spite of the controversial price controls imposed in 1956, inflation jumped from 6 
percent to 16 percent in the second half of the 1950s. In 1958 a stabilization 
program, that included removal of price controls as one of its objectives, was 
arranged with the IMF. However, annual GDP still fell to around 3 percent and 
called for the army’s first intervention in 1960.
In short, the 1950s liberalization program was a mess. Protectionism were back 
in the system soon after the liberalization program was launched. Starting as 
early as 1952, the government intervened in the economy extensively. This 
intervention took the form of price controls and agricultural subsidies that lead to 
disturbance in the supply of basic consumer goods. By the end of the 1950s, the 
free market economy was already replaced by protectionism. This regime 
caused a black market to develop in imported consumer goods and foreign 
exchange. Once again failure of free market mechanism gave rise to pessimism 
among the Turkish people and made stronger the perception of State as the 
savior.
All of these demonstrate how ill prepared the Turkish economy was for 
liberalization. Proposals for privatization were hard to institute due to the 
absence of developed financial markets and a stock exchange. The public 
sector as well as the private sector were inefficient. Turkish producers
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functioned in an economic environment protected by import tariffs, rising 
domestic consumption and government subsidies, and therefore saw no reason 
to improve efficiency.
In the 1960s, the governments main concern was to form a wide industrial base 
behind protective barriers aimed at import substitution. “Etatism” now developed 
into the “mixed economy”. The state’s economic role changed into supervision 
of the implementation of five year plans and assistance of the private sector’s 
growth. Under the first five year plan in 1960, Turkey was aimed to be developed 
into an exporting economy by 1975. Between 1960 and 1976, annual average 
growth rates reached figures as high as 6.7 percent in real terms. And, during 
this time important structural changes took place within the economy.
The government expenditure which were at least under some control in the 
1960s grew significantly in the 1970s as a result of agricultural subsidies, 
investments in infrastructure and the State Economic Enterprises (SEEs). These 
expansionary policies resulted in high inflation. When inflation became even 
worse due to the oil price increases, the government responded by imposing 
price controls once more with the obvious result of supply shortages by the late 
1970s. In 1977, the payment crisis came and once again Turkish economy’s 
underlying structural weakness was revealed. Government’s previous 
interference with the economy to control inflation by imposing price controls is 
one explanation for people’s adverse attitudes towards price increases by the
12
private sector in Turkey. Whenever a price increase takes place in a privately 
produced good, the public expects the government to introduce some kind of 
control on that pricing policy.
To recover from the crisis, in addition to the austerity measures adopted in 1978, 
structural reforms were implemented in the 1980s. All of these however came a 
little bit too late. At the start of the 1970s Turkish economy missed the 
opportunity to switch from protectionism and import substitution to free market 
system, and in the 1980s this was made even harder by the declining world 
growth rates and increasing protectionism in world markets. Once again, the 
military regime took over and actually initiated the most vital structural reforms in 
1980.
In 1980-83, being free from political pressures, the regime was able to pursue 
harsh austerity measures. Inflation had reached 110 percent in 1980. In 
response to this, Turgut Ozal abolished the Price Control Committee founded in 
1978. He adjusted the exchange rate to more realistic levels removed controls 
on industrial imports. Within a few years the regime brought inflation under 
some control (by 1982, inflation was down to 31 per cent), started widespread 
liberalization in financial and foreign exchange markets. Finally with the help of 
exports, growth was once again restored.
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However, in 1989 government still absorbed a significant portion of resources in 
the economy. Inflation continued to accelerate and interest rates reached very 
high levels. As a result, realization of liberalization reforms were further slowed 
down. One major of failing of the Ozal regime had been in its almost complete 
neglect for the growing polarization. Very small attention was paid to the social 
welfare measures. Very little resources were allocated to health and education.
During the 1990s, Turkey is no longer concerned with shortages. Now all kinds 
of products are available in the Turkish market. Investments are continually 
being made, even some are still done by the public sector. However, inflation is 
continually on the rise and the growth in imbalance in the distribution of wealth is 
a major concern.
Free Market Economy and Inflation
Today the owners of private enterprises in Turkey mostly believe in a market 
economy. Sakip Sabanci, a leading businessman in Turkey, expressed his 
feelings about free market economy as:
“We believe in a liberal and a market economy which is based on the 
right of ownership and the freedom of enterprise within an independent, 
democratic, and parliamentarian system. This belief, in short, is termed, 
a Free Market Economy.”®
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Even though the governments since 1980s have taken some important 
measures towards a free market economy, these free market economy
conditions have yet to become a dominant part of the economic life in Turkey.
It was also mentioned by Sabanci that
“supply and demand has not been able to assume its rightful place in our 
economic life. Attempts are being made to induce this balance by means 
of bureaucratic decisions and interventions. However the mistakes made 
with these interventions have either caused new problems to come to the 
forefront, or have caused the original problems to become even greater.”' “
One major problem Turkey is faced with in the 1990s is inflation, however it is 
argued that the free market system should not be blamed for this. Some claim 
the main reasons for high inflation are budget deficits and uncontrolled public 
and transfer spending. People in Turkey have learned to live with inflation from 
the experience they gained during the last twenty years. However, those with 
low or fixed incomes are more adversely affected by inflation.
Inflation and uneven income distribution play an important role in the formation of 
attitudes towards free markets in Turkey. It is a common belief that producers in 
Turkey take advantage of an increase in inflation to increase their prices much
15
more than the amount necessary to compensate them for the increase in 
inflation (eventually causing further increases in inflation.)
Recent Economic Developments and Prospects
As also stated previously, the Turkish economy achieved high rates of gro\A/th 
from 1980 to 1993. This was mainly assisted by the outward-looking orientation 
of trade policy in 1980 and structural reform. However, macroeconomic 
imbalances became even more pronounced after 1988. Continual financing of 
fiscal deficits resulted in high rates of inflation and a weak external position. 
Eventually, all of these imbalances gave rise to an exchange market crisis in 
early 1994. The government immediately implemented a stabilization package 
on April 5, 1994. Some of the proposed measures included (OECD 1995)” ;
“Immediate price increases for products of State economic enterprises 
(SEEs) ranging from 70 to 100 percent, to be followed by a six-month 
price freeze.”
“Maintenance of nominal spending levels on government wages and 
salaries as specified in the 1994 budget, despite higher inflation, implying 
a significant reduction in public-sector real wages.”
“A reduction in transfers to SEEs, of TL 16 trillion.”
16
“Cuts in public investment.”
“A shift to a more market-oriented agricultural system: government 
purchases would be limited to cereals, sugarbeet and tobacco, and 
support price adjustments would be limited in line with policies for wages 
and prices.”
Even though within a short period of time the measures helped restore the 
financial market stability, the real GDP fell by over 11 percent in the first half of 
1994. Labor market conditions deteriorated and inflation remained a major 
concern.
After joining the customs union with the ED, free trade forced the businesses in 
Turkey to operate more efficiently in order to survive the increased competition. 
Even though recently the privatization process is speeded and the agricultural 
support system is streamlined, inflation (annual inflation was announced in June 
1997 as 78 percent) and uneven income distribution are still some of the major 
obstacles in achieving a smoothly functioning free market system.
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The main objective in this study was to find the frequencies in Turkey of public 
understanding, values, attitudes, and behaviors relating to markets and compare 
these with those of Americans, Iranians, and Russians. Hence, the survey 
analysis of Shiller, Boycko and Korobov (1991) was repeated in Turkey in June 
1997.
The original questionnaire used by Shiller et al. included 36 questions. However, 
in their paper they compared the frequencies for 28 questions only. Therefore, 
our questionnaire consisted of these 28 questions.
The questions were originally designed by Shiller et al. to survey public opinion 
on the following eight issues:
• fairness of price changes
• attitudes toward income inequality
• popular theories about the importance on incentives
• resistance to exchange of money
• negative attitudes toward business
• perceptions of speculation
• understandings of compensated price changes
• expectations of possible future government interference
III. SURVEY METHOD
18
Some of the questions asked public opinion on specific issues, but in general the 
respondents were asked to think about some imaginary case that they might 
experience and to explain their behavior in that case. The questions were 
designed to present the same situation to all respondents (control for situational 
differences) so that any differences in responses could be attributed to 
differences in attitudes.
Shiller et al. and Habibi were careful in translating the original questionnaire from 
English into Russian and Persian respectively. Similarly, in translating the 
questionnaire from English into Turkish, care was taken to phrase questions in 
such a way that each question would create the same understanding for 
speakers of both languages. In question A7, the interest rate on a loan was 
changed from 3% to 5% per year (the interest rate on dollar currently offered by 
the banks in Turkey.) Question B6 asked peoples’ opinion related to an increase 
in the price of coffee. Here, the same question was asked for tea instead, since 
tea is more widely used in Turkey. A 30% inflation rate in question B10 was 
changed to 70%, since the inflation rate is much higher in Turkey. Question C4 
uses gallons as a measure of gasoline. This was converted into liters since 
metric system is used in Turkey. And finally, in question C6 11,600TL/kwh was 
used as the price of electricity, since this was the rate used by the Public Service 
in Turkey at the time of the survey.
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In New York and Moscow, telephone surveys were conducted (in May 1990) with 
randomly selected individuals of 18 years of age or older. 391 residents of 
Moscow and 361 residents of New York City consolidated metropolitan statistical 
area were interviewed. The original questionnaire consisted of 36 questions. 
Because of its length, the questions were grouped into three categories (denoted 
as A, B, and C in the question numbers), and each participant was asked to 
respond to only one part consisting of 12 questions. There were about 120-130 
responses per question in each country.
In Tehran, which is the financial center of Iran, social cluster sampling method 
was used (in May 1995). This method is explained in Habibi (1995) as follows:
“Each individual is surrounded by a network of relatives, colleagues and friends. I 
consider this network a social cluster. Instead of directly choosing a random sample of 
individuals for interview, I choose a smaller sample of individuals and then ask each 
person to interview the members of her social cluster. I chose a group of graduates in 
Institute for Research in Planning and Development and another group of undergraduate 
students in Shahid Beheshti University as my interviewers.”'^
Overall, he was able to collect a total of 603 responses. In order to make the 
sample closer to a representative sample of Tehran residents in terms of 
educational background, he randomly removed some of the college students and 
college graduates from the sample. Eventually, he ended up with a smaller 
sample of 215 responses.
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In Turkey, the survey was implemented by means of face-to-face interviews (in 
June 1997). Telephone and mail survey methods were not considered, because 
of their low response rate and high cost of implementation in Turkey.
127 interviews were conducted in Ankara metropolitan area in June 1997. In 
census maps, Ankara is divided into seven regions: Altindag, Çankaya, 
Etimesgut, Keçiören, Mamak, Sincan, and Yenimahalle. For each region, the 
State Institute of Statistics (SIS) provides information on poor, middle class, and 
rich neighborhoods.
Table I 1990 Census and its distribution
1990 CENSUS
REG IO N PO O R M IDDLE RICH TOTAL
K EÇİÖ REN 265 ,780 144,905 118,313 528,998
YENİM AH ALLE 129,836 182,004 15,263 327,103
M AM AK 364 ,897 34 ,709 399,606
ETİM ESG UT 4 0 ,257 5,509 45,766
SINCAN 2,346 82 ,096 84,442
ALTINDAĞ 310,858 39 ,255 50 ,629 400 ,742
Ç A NK AYA 112,997 41 ,402 313 ,687 468,086
TO TA L 1,186,714 564,628 503,401 2,254 .743
S ource: S ta te  Institute of S tatistics, Turkey.
After carefully analyzing the SIS tables from 1990 census, Keçiören,
Yenimahalle, and Çankaya were selected to conduct the survey. Mamak was 
eliminated since it was not in Ankara metropolitan area. Etimesgut, on the other 
hand, mostly consisted of families of military officers. Hence this would not be a 
representative sample of Turkey either. Sincan, when compared to Yenimahalle,
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had a relatively smaller poor and no rich neighborhoods. We expected to find 
more poor people in Keçiören, middle-class people in Yenimahalle and rich 
people in Gaziosmanpaşa (Çankaya).
Apart from the survey questions, the respondents were asked to report their sex, 
education, occupation, age and marital status. Since eventually we would 
compare our results with the other three countries, it was important that the 
sample characteristics were not too far from each other.
Table II Sample Characteristics 13
T U R K E Y
C O U N T R Y
IR A N U SSR U SA
A verage A ge 32.82 34.33 42 45
% o f  W om en 35.40% 36 .30% 58% 60%
C ollege
A ttendance*
39% 20% 66% 50%
N um ber o f  
R espondents
127 215 120 131
* Respondents who either had a college degree or were university students.
Turkey, like Iran, has a younger population than both USSR and USA. It is also 
not surprising that a relatively low percent of women participated in the survey in 
Turkey. In general, Turkish culture is protective of women. It is usually 
considered to be improper for a stranger (especially for a man) to approach a 
woman whom he does not know. In addition, because a large part of the survey 
was implemented on a week-end, we were mostly greeted by the male members 
of the households. In contrast, in the USSR and USA, because telephone
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interviews were conducted, it were mostly the women who picked up the phone 
and participated in the study.
Some More Statistics for Turkey
Table III Population by literacy, education levels and sex
1990
M ale Fem ale
L iterate 88.8 72.0
L itera te  w ith o u t d ip lom a 16.3 15.6
P rim ary  schoo l (6-11 years old) 49.1 43.1
Ju n io r h igh schoo l (12 -14  ) 9.6 5.4
H igh schoo l (15 -18) 9.5 6.0
H igher education 4.2 1.8
Source: State Institute of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, 1993.
Table IV Youth population and participation in education, 1991
share o f  enro lled  studen ts in the
popula tion , 5-29 years S tudents
popu la tion as a share
5-29  years o f  total
as p ercen t o f P rim ary and population
total low er U pper T ertiary
p o pu la tion  Total secondary  secondary education
T urkey  51 .8  38.8 31 .0  5.3 2.5 20.1
U .S . 36 .9  55.2 35.2 9.6 10.5 20.4
Source: State Planning Organization, OECD, Education at a glance, 1993.
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IV. SURVEY RESULTS AND COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES 
Fairness of Price Changes
One of the significant barriers to the clearing of free markets is the common 
attitude that price increases may be unfair. If businessmen feel that their 
behavior is constrained by this, they will use non-market based ways of 
distributing their goods.
It is a common thought that people who live long periods of time under stable 
government-controlled prices will be characteristically hesitant to accept market 
prices. However, survey results of Daniel Kahneman et al. (1986) show that the 
North American people, who are accustomed to living under prices set according 
to market principles, are no different in their attitudes towards price increases. 
They consider price increases unfair as much as the others. This lead Shiller 
and his colleagues to think that such a result might be due to general human 
behavior and not just a characteristic of the Soviets (or people from other 
countries who live under government controlled prices.)
For a beneficial assessment of the attitudes toward free prices in Turkey, we will 
compare Turks, Iranians, Russians and Americans answering to identical 
questions in identical scenarios.
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Under a free market economy, supply or demand changes for a product are 
usually followed by changes in the price. For example, if the demand for a good 
increases and the supply is limited, ceteris paribus, the producers might increase 
the price of their product even though there has been no changes in the cost.
The group of questions below are aimed at revealing the type of price increases 
considered fair by the respondents in the four countries examined.
B2. On a holiday, when there is a great demand for flowers, their prices usually 
go up. Is it fair for flower sellers to raise their prices like this?
Response Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A
1) Yes 29.4 23.9 34 32
2) No 70.6 76.1 66 68
N: 126 209 131 119
Chi-square (TS)^''=4.756 Chi-square (5% cut-off) =7.815
B11. /A small factory produces kitchen tables and sells them at $200 each. 
There is so much demand for the tables that it cannot meet it fully. The factory 
decides to raise the price of its tables by $20, when there was no change in the 
costs of producing tables. Is this fair?
Response Turkey
1) Yes 25.4
2) No 74.6
N: 126
Chi-square (TS) =2.274
Iran Russia U.S.A.
30.3 34 30
69.7 66 70
208 131 120
Chi-square (5% cut-off) =7.815
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A9. A new railway line makes travel between city and summer homes positioned 
along this rail line substantially easier. Accordingly, summer homes along this 
railway become more desirable. Is it fair if rents are raised on summer homes 
there?
Response Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
1) Yes 36.8 62.9 57 61
2) No 63.2 37.1 43 39
N; 125 213 98 115
Chi-square (TS) =23.923 Chi-square (5% cut-off) =7.815
In questions B2 and B11 wee seek to discover whether respondents find it fair 
for producers to raise their prices following an unexpected demand shift. In all 
four countries the majority of the respondents said that they found this behavior 
of the producers to be unfair. However a larger portion of Turkish respondents 
found this behavior unfair when compared with their Russian and American 
counterparts.
The answer of the Turkish respondents to question A9 which asks whether 
appreciation of property values due to railway development is fair or not, is very 
different from the other three countries. With respect to this question, there is a 
tendency in Iran, Russia and the US to report that price increases are fair. 
Surprisingly, Turkish respondents found raising prices to be unfair in this 
situation as well. It seems like Turks dislike any kind of price increase. This 
might be attributed to one of the biggest problems Turkey has been trying to 
solve for a long time; inflation. People in Turkey, specially the poor, have 
suffered a lot from inflation. They have even denoted inflation as a “monster” in
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their daily life. So, it is not actually very unexpected that they have reacted in 
this way.
Some respondents (usually the religious people) also mentioned that they found 
this behavior of the producers very “opportunistic.” They have suggested that 
the producers should try to sell more at the old low prices, instead of raising their 
prices and trying to make a gain using other people.
The results in Turkey so far do not confirm what Shiller et al. suggested in their 
study. Shiller claimed that,
“Notions of fairness are very situation-specific; flower sellers are unfair if they raise their 
prices, while land-lords who do so in the circumstances described are usually not. 
Notions of fairness are not country specific. The bottom line from all of this is that there is 
a little foundation to the aforementioned claims that Soviets are characteristically resistant 
to unfair price changes."^®
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In order to have a further understanding of fairness, the respondents were asked 
the following two questions ;
B3. Should the government introduce limits on the increase in prices of flowers, 
even if it might produce a shortage of flowers?
Response Turkey
1) Yes 50.4
2) No 49.6
N: 125
Chi-square (TS) =45.334
Iran Russia U.S.A.
66.8 54 28
33.2 46 72
211 123 115
Chi-square (5% cut-off) =7.815
B12. Apart from fairness, should the factory have the right to raise price in this 
situation?
Response Turkey
1) Yes 31.5
2) No 68.5
N; 124
Chi-square (TS) =40.584
Iran Russia U.S.A.
31.1 57 59
68.9 43 41
209 118 118
Chi-square (5% cut-off) =7.815
Like Iranians and Russians, Turks are more inclined to accept price controls than 
Americans. This is not unexpected at all since Turkish people for a long time 
lived under “etatism" and government interference.
While the Soviets and Americans want the manufacturer of tables to have the 
right to raise price, Turkish and Iranian respondents want this behavior to be 
illegal. The fact that almost a half of Turkish respondents answered “No” to 
question B3 and even a larger percentage answered “No” to question B12 shows 
that they are not receptive of market induced prices at all. This might be again
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due to similar reasons mentioned before. Long experience with government 
controlled prices as well as high inflation and religious beliefs might be some of 
the factors causing this behavior.
Further information on the fairness issue can be obtained by asking whether an 
action is “moral”. Question C10 raises the issue of profiteering and asks whether 
it would be fair for a merchant to make profit using the rural people.
CIO. A small merchant company buys vegetables from some rural people, brings 
the vegetables to the city, and sells them, making from this a large profit. The 
company honestly and openly tells the rural people what it is doing, and these 
people freely sell the company the vegetables at the agreed price. Is this 
behavior of the company, making large profits using the rural people, acceptable 
from moral point of view?
1) Yes
2) No
N;
Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
42.9 66.7 49 59
57.1 33.3 51 41
119 207 120 116
=20.721 Chi-square (5% cut-off) =7.815
The Turkish citizens are more concerned about profiteering. 57% of the Turkish 
respondents found this behavior to be morally unacceptable. Income distribution 
in Turkey has become more unfair over the years. This has resulted in a large 
number of poor people and therefore anger (as well as envy) developed over the 
years towards those who make high profits using the poor people.
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Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
50.4 63.5 43 36
49.6 36.5 57 64
119 208 104 109
To learn whether people would prefer a solution that involves rationing of 
quantities to one that leads to inflation the following question was asked:
C4. Suppose that the government wishes to reduce consumption of gasoline. 
They propose two methods of attaining this goal. First, the government could 
prohibit gas stations from selling, for example, more than five gallons to one 
person. Second, the government could put a tax on gasoline, and prices of 
gasoline would go up. From your point of view, which of these methods is 
better?
Response
1) First
2) Second 
N: 
Chi-square (TS) =25.499 Chi-square (5% cut-off) =7.815
While Russians and the Americans preferred the second method as a solution to 
reduction of consumption of gasoline, the Iranians wanted the first method more. 
Here the Turkish respondents remained indifferent between the two methods. 
Actually during the face-to-face interviews a lot of people commented that they 
did not like any of the two methods. However the question asked them to 
choose among the two methods and because this was not an open ended 
question they picked the one which they thought would be the best. Turkey has 
a history of long lines as well as high inflation. So, actually people in Turkey do 
not like any of the methods mentioned in the question.
Overall, the evidence suggests that the Turkish people are not ready to live in an 
environment where prices are set freely. Concerns of inflation and unfair income 
distribution seem to be slowing down smooth functioning of free market economy 
in Turkey.
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As also demonstrated by the responses of the Turkish people, attitudes toward 
fairness are very related to attitudes toward inequality. The United States has a 
reputation for being the most capitalist country so in this category we expect the 
Americans to be less concerned about income inequality especially compared to 
the Soviets with long history of Communism.
Question A4 is designed to see whether envy of people who would succeed 
under a reform, that actually benefits all, would cause a resistance to that reform.
Attitudes Toward Income Inequality
A4. Suppose the government wants to undertake a reform to improve the 
productivity of the economy. As a result, everyone will be better off, but the 
improvement in life will not affect people equally. A million people (people who 
respond energetically to the incentives in the plan and people with certain skills) 
will see their incomes triple while everyone else will see only a tiny income 
increase, about 1 percent. Would you support the plan?
1) Yes
2) No
N:
Chi-square (TS) =25.921
Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
26.8 51 55 38
73.2 49 45 64
123 206 114 99
Chi-square (5% cut-off) =7.815
The plan described above makes everyone better off. Hence any resistance to 
such reform can be attributed to the inequality created by the plan.
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The results show that the Turkish citizens were the most resistant. It is 
surprising that the Russians who lived long periods under Communist ideology 
were the most receptive of this reform. One major failing of most regimes in 
Turkey has been their total disregard for social welfare measures. Studies on 
the subject showed growing polarization of income distribution.
Popular Theories About The Importance 
of Incentives
It has been the common belief that the reason for the Soviet Union’s slow 
progress in switching to a market system was the lack of incentive for hard work 
and productivity in her economic system.
To find about the respondents ideas about incentives created by the free market 
system the respondents were asked the following question:
A1. Do you think that people work better if their pay is directly tied to the quantity 
and quality of their work?
1) Yes
2) No
N;
Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
85.7 83.3 90 86
14.3 16.7 10 14
126 215 121 119
=2.846 Chi-square (5% cut-off) =7.815
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Contrary to popular beliefs, the Soviets responded much like Americans. 
Moreover, Turks and Iranians responded like the Soviets and Americans. 
Hence, we do not observe significant inter-country differences with respect to 
this question.
The same question was asked in somewhat different way:
C3. Which of the following qualities is more important for the manager of a 
company? /Response Choices.· 1) The manager must show good will in his 
relation to workers and win their friendship; 2) The manager must be a strict 
enforcer of work discipline, giving incentives to hard workers and punishing 
laggards.]
Response
1
2
N;
Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
42.6 28.4 33 49
57.4 71 68 51
122 215 112 109
=16.008 Chi-square (5% cut-off) =7.815
In response to question about the suitable management style, more Iranians and 
Soviets chose a strict manger in comparison to Turks and Americans.
Turkish people’s response is not unexpected. Usually, in Turkish Culture 
personal relationships are more important than the formal duties. Moreover, in 
order to work with someone effectively it is believed that first a personal 
relationship needs to be established. This is very well explained in Dindi et al. 
(1989):
33
“ In order to work with someone effectively, Turks first need a personal relationship. 
Taking the time to establish this relationship seems like a waste of valuable time to many 
Americans, but in the long run more will be accomplished. If the boss is perceived as 
pushy and not interested in developing a relationship, the workers will tend to frustrate 
his/her demands for action. Recognizing the importance of relationships, and accepting 
this as a value may help the manager be more effective.
Turkish counterparts offer the manager tea, ask about his family and intersperse personal 
comments during business discussions.”''®
Actually some respondents mentioned that they would like a mix of the two. The 
fact that some 42% prefer a friendly manager reflects that friendship is still 
somewhat valued in Turkish culture.
The following question evaluates the respondents’ familiarity with the popular 
capitalist theory that there is a trade off between income inequality and 
efficiency.
A2. Some have expressed the following: "It’s too bad that some people are poor 
while others are rich. But we can't fix that: if the government were to make sure 
that everyone had the same income, we would all be poor, since no one would 
have any material incentive to work hard. ” Have you heard such a theory or not? 
If yes, how often?
Response 
1) Often
N:
Chi-square (TS) =52.991
Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
20.6 19.7 38 7
38.1 27.2 39 38
41.3 53.1 23 55
126 213 125 120
Chi-square (5% cut-off) =12.592
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In response to question A2, 58.7% of Turkish respondents (compared to 77% 
Russians, 48% Iranians and 45% Americans) said that they had heard such a 
theory at least once. This is a lower percentage than Russians but still higher 
than Iranians and Americans. Turks seem to be more informed about this 
subject than their Iranian and American counterparts.
When asked whether they like such a theory or not:
A3. Do you yourself personally agree with this theory?
1) Yes
2) No
N:
Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
36.1 27 41 38
63.9 73 59 62
122 215 110 116
=8.173 Chi-square (5% cut-off) =7.815
None of the countries seem to like this theory very much. Turks responded very 
similarly to Americans. We observed that, in all four countries, people resent 
high levels of economic inequality.
Resistance to Exchange of Money
Voluntary and unrestricted exchange of money comes with a free market system. 
Shiller et al. (1992) designed this category of questions having in mind that
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“fairness, equity, and friendship might inhibit such exchanges relatively more in 
the Soviet U n i o n . O r i e n t a l  cultures are known to emphasize family and 
friendship as well. So we expect that Turkish citizens as well as Iranians will be 
reluctant to charge a friend interest on a loan.
A7. Suppose you have agreed to lend a friend some money for six months, so 
that he will not miss a good opportunity to buy a summer home. Suppose banks 
are offering interest rates of 3 percent per year. Would you charge him interest 
on the loan?
1) Yes
2) No
N:
Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
8.7 33.2 6 29
91.3 66.8 94 71
127 214 117 111
=50,431 Chi-square (5% cut-off) =7.815
Most people in all countries said that they would not charge a friend interest on 
the loan. The percent of Turkish respondents who gave a positive answer were 
a little bit higher than Russians and somewhat lower than Americans and 
Iranians.
Americans are used to short-term relationships that involve relatively few 
reciprocal obligations. People in Turkey, on the other hand, are involved more 
deeply in the relationship and expect certain mutual responsibilities as a part of 
the relationship. There is reliance and sharing among the members of the group. 
One of the respondents expressed his opinion by saying: “If I knew this money 
would benefit my friend in any way, I would just give it to him without asking any 
money back.” In addition to deep friendship, another explanation for this
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question comes from religious beliefs. Islam prohibits charging interest on a 
loan.
In order to make sure that the answer is independent of the institutional 
environment, we asked the following question which is not related to experience 
with free market economy.
A8. If you went on a vacation with friends and there were a lot of shared 
expenses, would there be a careful accounting of who spent what and a settling 
of accounts afterwards?
1) Yes
2) No
N;
Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
66.4 81.8 30 47
33.6 18.2 70 53
125 214 116 118
=96.784 Chi-square (5% cut-off) =7.815
In response to this question, large portion of Turks and Iranians said that they 
would keep a careful accounting of expenses. In Turkey and Iran incomes are 
low. Hence, it is important to share costs.
Actually, many Turkish respondents stated that, in reality, during a vacation they 
share the expenses equally among themselves. So, even though expenses are 
shared among the group, it might be that there is no careful accounting of who 
spent what. I suspect that some of those who responded “Yes” to this question 
actually in practice behave in this way. Similarly, some of the people who
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responded “No” might still share expenses but do not keep a careful accounting 
of who spent what.
B7 was asked with the same goal in mind as question A8:
B7. You are standing in long line to buy something. You see that someone 
comes to the line and is very distressed that the line is so long, saying he is in a 
great hurry and absolutely must make this purchase. A person at the front of the 
line offers to let him take his place in line for $10.00. Would you be annoyed at 
this deal even though it won’t cause you to wait any longer?
1) Yes
2) No
N;
Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A
63.2 34.5 69 44
36.8 65.5 31 56
125 206 132 117
=49.213 Chi-square (5% cut-off) =7.815
The Turkish respondents would be almost as much annoyed as the Soviets. 
Standing in lines used to be a major problem in Turkey in the past. In addition, 
the widening income inequality and increasing poverty might have resulted in a 
dislike towards the rich. It might be that they cannot tolerate people solving their 
problems using their money while they are stuck in the line because they can not 
afford to pay such an amount.
Overall, the evidence from this category shows that Turks, like Russians, are 
more resistant in adopting the exchange of money as a solution to their 
problems.
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Negative Attitudes Toward Business
Originally these questions were asked in the Soviet Union to see whether, since 
Soviets lived long periods under Communism, they have developed any more 
negative attitudes toward business in comparison to Americans.
In order to find whether successful businessmen would be congratulated by their 
relatives and friends the following question was asked;
C1. Suppose that as a result of successful business dealings you unexpectedly 
became rich. How do you imagine it would be received by your relatives at a 
holiday family meeting? Would they congratulate you and show great interest, or 
would they be judgmental and contemptuous? [Response choices; 1) They 
would show interest, would congratulate; 2) They would be judgmental and 
contemptuous; 3) They would be quiet indifferent.]
Response Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A
1 65.3 30.3 72 92
2 16.1 53.6 12 6
3 18.5 16.1 16 3
N; 124 211 113 117
Chi-square (TS) =156.354 Chi-square (5% cut-off) =12.592
In a free market system, if you happen to be engaged in the right business at the 
right time you can become rich “over-night”. It is possible that those who work 
very hard and yet make a small living be jealous of these businessmen.
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In Turkey, Russia and the US, a successful businessman is received more 
positively by friends and relatives compared to Iran.
C9. Do you think that, if you worked independentiy today as a businessman and 
received profit, your friends and acquaintances wouid respect you iess and not 
treat you as you deserve?
Response Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
1) Yes 21.8 21.6 19 4
2) No 78.2 78.4 81 96
N: 119 208 115 120
Chi-square (TS) =19.322 Chi-square (5% cut-off) =7.815
A larger portion of respondents in four countries said that an independent 
businessman would be respected and treated right.
In order to find whether showing off one’s wealth is desired and helpful in making 
friends we asked the following question:
C2. If you ever became rich, would you really like to spend some of the money 
by purchasing really fashionable clothes, expensive cars, or other extravagant 
items that make an impression on people?
Response
1) Yes
2) No
N;
Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
23.8 46 35 50
76.2 54 65 50
122 213 115 120
=22.764 Chi-square (5% cut-off) =7.815
Almost half of the Americans and Iranians said that they would show off, while 
the majority of the Turks and Russians said they would not. There are some 70 
million people living in Turkey and only a small portion of this population is able
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to actually live in luxury. As Shiller argued about Russian response, most people 
in Turkey, have more immediate problems in their mind than thinking about what 
to do if they “ever” become rich. Once again, we felt the influence of Islam in 
some people’s responses here. The relatively more religious people said that 
they would rather distribute their wealth to the poor.
To obtain further information on the attitudes toward success in business, the 
respondents were asked to make a choice between fortune and fame:
B4. Which of the following achievements would please you more? [Response 
choices; 1) You win fortune without fame: you make enough money through 
successful business dealings so that you can live very comfortably for the rest of 
your life; 2) You win fame without fortune; for example you win a medal at the 
Olympics or you become a respected journalist or scholar.]
Response Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
1 51.6 56 65 54
2 48.4 44 35 46
N: 124 209 92 117
Chi-square (TS) =4.189 Chi-square (5% cut-off) =7.815
Majority of respondents in four countries preferred making money to winning 
fame. Some respondent in Turkey mentioned that they would like to have 
fortune and fame together.
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A5. Is it important to you that your work benefits the country, and is not just to 
make money? Is it very important, somewhat important, or not important? 
[Response choices; 1) Very important; 2) Somewhat important; 3) Not 
important.]
Response Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
1 74.8 38.5 69 40
2 20.5 33.8 25 45
3 4.7 27.7 6 15
N: 127 213 130 119
Chi-square (TS) =81.409 Chi-square (5% cut-off) =12.592
Even though the results imply that Americans care more about the money, as 
Shiller suggested, it might be that the Americans feel freer to accept this.
Question C11 was asked to find about respondents’ prejudices against 
businessmen:
C11. Do you think that it is likely to be difficult to make friends with people who 
have their own business (individual or small corporation) and are trying to make 
a profit?
Response
1) Yes
2) No
N:
Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
32.2 46.6 51 20
67.8 53.4 50 80
118 206 111 121
=32.445 Chi-square (5% cut-off) =7.815
When compared with Turks and Americans, Iranians and Russians find 
businessmen more unfriendly.
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C5. Do you think that those who try to make a lot of money will often turn out to 
be not very honest people?
1) Yes
2) No
N:
Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A
45.8 46.7 59 39
54.2 53.3 41 62
118 214 114 117
=9.627 Chi-square (5% cut-off) =7.815
Again like Iranians and Russians, the Turks think more negative of the 
businessmen than the Americans. There is some corruption in the way business 
is conducted in Turkey and this might be the reason for the relatively high “Yes” 
response.
Overall, these last two questions show that Turkish respondents do not hold 
negative prejudices about businessmen.
Perceptions of Speculation
In this section, we try to find what people think as the consequences of 
speculation that is legally practiced in capitalist countries. Opposition to such 
behavior might be attributed to peoples’ perception of it as unfair or dislike 
towards income inequality.
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B6. If the price of coffee on the world market suddenly increased by 30 percent, 
what do you think is likely to be the blame? [Response choices; 1) Interventions 
of some government; 2) Such things as bad harvest in Brazil or unexpected 
changes in demand; 3) Speculators’ efforts to raise prices.]
Response Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
1 18.9 36.4 17 13
2 27.9 20.2 51 36
3 53.3 43.4 32 51
N; 122 198 109 111
Chi-square (TS) =51.487 Chi-square (5% cut-off) =12.592
Turkish and American respondents blamed the speculators for such a price 
increase. It is a bit surprising that the government were the least blamed in 
Turkey, despite its poor performance in lowering the inflation for a long time.
Question C8 is designed to tackle the issue of speculation rather directly;
C8. Grain traders in capitalist countries sometimes hold grain without selling it, 
putting it in temporary storage in anticipation of higher prices later. Do you think 
this “speculation” will cause more frequent shortages of flour, bread, and other 
grain products? Or will it cause such shortages to become rarer? [Response 
choices; 1) Shortages more common; 2) Shortages less common; 3) No effect 
on shortages.]
Response
1
2
3
N;
Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
35.3 67.6 45 66
16.0 17.2 31 26
48.7 15.1 24 8
119 186 110 112
=77.349 Chi-square (5% cut-off) =12.592
In Turkey majority of people said that speculation will have no effect on 
shortages. In answering this way. they stated that prices would increase instead.
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In the past when some sellers engaged in similar practices, black markets were 
formed and people who were willing to pay higher prices could still have access 
to those goods. This experience might have lead the Turkish respondents to the 
belief that speculation causes higher prices and not shortages.
While speculators were not blamed for causing shortages in Turkey, the opposite 
was observed in the other three countries.
Overall the speculators in Turkey were held responsible of price increases but 
not of shortages.
Understandings of Compensated Price Changes
This section addresses the issue of compensated price changes and tries to find 
whether such practices will be accepted by the public. Most economic reforms 
involve some form of compensation and if they are not correctly understood by 
the people, a resistance to the reform forms and prevents its implementation.
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C6. Suppose the price of electricity rises fourfold, from 10 cents per kilowatt hour 
to 40 cents per kilowatt hour. No other prices change. Suppose also that at the 
same time your monthly income increases by exactly enough to pay for the extra 
cost of electricity without cutting back on any of your other expenditures. Please 
evaluate how your overall material well-being has changed. Would you consider 
your situation: 1) Somewhat better off; 2) Exactly the same; 3) Somewhat 
worse off?
Response Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
1 4.2 20.4 9 3
2 54.2 60.2 77 63
3 41.7 19.4 14 34
N: 120 186 120 121
Chi-square (TS) =58.069 Chi-square (5% cut-off) =12.592
Although more than half of the respondents in Turkey correctly understood that 
such a change would not affect their situation, a significant percent said that they 
would be worse off. These people said that they were concerned about the 
changes this price increase in electricity would induce on the other parts of the 
economy. They believed that because electricity prices increased so many other 
things would become expensive and eventually they would be worse off.
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Question B10 is a compensation scheme related to a more general price
increase:
B10. Suppose that economists have come to the conclusion that we could 
substantially Improve our standard of living in the next year if we would be willing 
to accept a 30-per-cent inflation rate (increase in the prices of goods by 30 
percent). This would mean that our incomes would rise by more than 30 
percent. Then we could buy more goods at the new higher prices. Would you 
support such a proposal?
Response
1) Yes
2) No
N:
Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
36.6 58.2 47 28
63.4 41.8 53 72
123 194 118 115
=30.792 Chi-square (5% cut-off) =7.815
The Turkish citizens have a relatively high rate of refusal to such a proposal. 
They perfectly understood that such a proposal would improve their standard of 
living, yet most of the respondents said that they wanted a “life without inflation.” 
This is not very unexpected considering the fact that lowering inflation has been 
on the agenda of every regime in power so far. Inflation has been very high in 
Turkey and no government has been really successful in lowering it to the 
targeted level. Many people, especially the poor, feel that their income keeps 
eroding under inflation.
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Expectations of Possible Future 
Government Interference
Investments in a country are affected very much by the uncertainty in the 
property rights. If the property rights are not well established, there will be less 
people willing to spend in that country resulting in very small or no economic 
growth.
C7. How likely do you think it is that in the next few years the government will, in 
some way, nationalize (that is, take over) most private businesses with little or no 
compensation to the owners? Is such nationalization quite likely, possible, 
unlikely, or impossible? [Response choices: 1) Quite likely; 2) Possible; 3) 
Unlikely; 4) Impossible.]
Response Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
1 9.3 4.2 20 5
2 15.3 7.0 40 11
3 34.7 22.8 29 53
4 40.7 66.0 11 31
N: 118 215 114 118
Chi-square (TS) =156.937 Chi-square (5% cut-off) =16.919
B8. How likely is it, from your point of view, that the government in the next few 
years will take measures, in one way or another, to prevent those who have 
saved a great deal from making use of their savings? Is it quite likely, possible, 
unlikely, or impossible that the government will do this? [Response choices: 1) 
Quite likely; 2) Possible; 3) Unlikely; 4) Impossible.]
Response Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
1 16.3 5.7 17 15
2 22.0 14.7 44 37
3 30.1 26.5 21 39
4 31.7 53.1 19 9
N; 123 211 112 117
Chi-square (TS) =103.335 Chi-square (5% cut-off) =16.919
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The Turks feel confident about the property rights in Turkey. Investments in 
Turkey are highly supported and subsidized by the government. In addition 
there is a large scale privatization in progress these days. Some very big public 
enterprises have already been privatized v\/hile many more are being considered 
for privatization in the near future. These actions were broadcasted on national 
TV and mentioned almost daily in the papers so the public is very much aware of 
this structural change. Hence, they found it unlikely that the government will 
interfere in private businesses in the near future.
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V. CONCLUSION
The objective of this thesis was to repeat in Turkey a survey of attitudes towards 
free markets and compare the results with the findings of similar surveys in Iran, 
the former Soviet Union and the United States. The purpose of the original study 
that was conducted in the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in 1991 was to find out whether 
the Russians and Americans were characteristically different in their attitudes 
toward free markets. The study showed that the Soviets and Americans held 
similar attitudes on most of the issues. Therefore, it was concluded that the 
existing differences “should not be attributed to peculiarities of national 
character; rather, the economic and political interests should be given more 
weight.” ®^
The purpose of repeating the same survey in Turkey is to discover whether the 
attitudes of Turkish citizens are significantly different from Iranians, Americans 
and Russians. As it was also done in the original study, I classified the 
responses into eight categories each of which targeted a different aspect of a 
free market economy. The results show that on some issues the attitudes of 
Turks are similar to Iranians, Russians, or Americans, while on other issues they 
are significantly different.
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The survey results show that Turks are characteristically resistant to price 
changes. This result is not in line with Shiller’s claim that notions of fairness are 
situation-specific and not country-specific. The evidence suggests that Turkish 
citizens are not ready to live in an environment where prices are set freely. I 
believe the attitudes of people in Turkey towards fairness of price changes are 
mostly influenced by the history of policy-making. This result is very much a 
product of past historical experience with frequent government interference to 
control inflation by imposing price controls. Of course unfair income distribution 
and resulting envy of those who are successful under a free market economy are 
the other important factors that contribute to this resentment of market induced 
prices. As it was described in the previous sections, the attitudes toward 
fairness are very related to attitudes toward inequality. And, the studies on the 
subject do show growing polarization of income distribution in Turkey. Hence, 
income inequality is another important obstacle to the acceptance of market 
induced prices. Although the survey results show that people in all four countries 
resent high levels of economic inequality, Turks are the most sensitive to this 
subject.
The survey results show that while price increases due to sudden demand shifts 
are considered unfair in all four countries, appreciation of property values as a 
result of railway development is found unfair only in Turkey. The Turks, Iranians, 
and Soviets are all supportive of price controls. In addition, Turks and Iranians 
want the price-increasing behavior of the producers to be illegal. Among the four
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countries, Turks are the most and Iranians are the least concerned about 
profiteering. Turks, like Russians, are less likely to accept exchange of money 
as a solution to personal problems. Iranians, however, are not more resistant to 
exchange of money in dealing with friends than Americans. While the Turks do 
not hold any negative prejudices about businessmen, the Soviets’ attitudes 
toward businessmen are less warm and larger number of Iranians think that a 
successful businessmen will face envy from his relatives. Both in the States and 
Iran, speculators are blamed for price increases and shortages. In Turkey, 
speculators are held responsible of price increases only. In the former Soviet 
Union, on the other hand, they were only blamed for shortages. While Iranians 
and Russians support compensated price changes, Turks and Americans are 
against such reforms. People in all countries, except the former Soviet Union, 
feel confident about property rights.
Overall, the evidence indicates that Turkish are supportive of price controls, are 
resistant to exchange of money as a solution to their problems, and are opposed 
to compensated price changes (mainly due to the existing dislike towards 
inflation.) While these attitudes are important barriers to the success of free 
markets, on some issues attitudes in Turkey are indeed in favor of the market 
system. Particularly, Turks seem to be more informed about the importance of 
incentives than Americans. They do not hold negative prejudices about 
businessmen. Moreover, they do feel confident about the property rights in 
Turkey.
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An important finding of this study is that the negative attitudes toward free 
markets in Turkey are generally a result of past historical experience. Turkish 
consumers are generally against a market system because they are taught to 
think this way. Historically, governments used price controls extensively as a 
tool to stop inflation. Even today, the local municipalities control the prices of 
some vital products (e.g. meat, bread) and the producers of these products are 
required to get permission from their municipalities to have any price changes. I 
believe price controls are adequate in case of a monopoly, for example, where 
there is imperfect competition. However, if people are still against price 
increases in markets which are almost perfectly competitive, this is because of 
history of policy-making. Hence, in order to reduce and gradually overcome the 
resistance to price changes and therefore eventually remove an important barrier 
to the success of a market reform in Turkey, the government must take the 
necessary measures to reduce inflation (of course without imposing any price 
controls) and achieve a more fair distribution of income.
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APPENDICES
Appendix I 
Survey Questions:
A1. Do you think that people work better if their pay is directly tied to the quantity 
and quality of their work?
Response
1) Yes
2) No
N:
Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
85.7 83.3 90 86
14.3 16.7 10 14
126 215 121 119
A2. Some have expressed the following: "It’s too bad that some people are poor 
while others are rich. But we can’t fix that: if the government were to make sure 
that everyone had the same income, we would all be poor, since no one would 
have any material incentive to work hard." Have you heard such a theory or not? 
If yes, how often?
Response
1) Often
2) Once or twice
3) Never heard it
N:
Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
20.6 19.7 38 7
38.1 27.2 39 38
41.3 53.1 23 55
126 213 125 120
A3. Do you yourself personally agree with this theory?
Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
36.1 27 41 38
63.9 73 59 62
122 215 110 116
Response
1) Yes
2) No
N:
A4. Suppose the government wants to undertake a reform to improve the 
productivity of the economy. As a result, everyone will be better off, but the 
improvement in life will not affect people equally. A million people (people who 
respond energetically to the incentives in the plan and people with certain skills) 
will see their incomes triple while everyone else will see only a tiny income 
increase, about 1 percent. Would you support the plan?
Response
1) Yes
2) No
N;
Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
26.8 51 55 38
73.2 49 45 64
123 206 114 99
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A5. Is it important to you that your work benefits the country, and is not just to 
make money? Is it very important, somewhat important, or not important?
[Response
important.]
choices: 1) Very important; 2) Somewhat important; 3) Not
Response Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
1 74.8 38.5 69 40
2 20.5 33.8 25 45
3 4.7 27.7 6 15
N: 127 213 130 119
A7. Suppose you have agreed to lend a friend some money for six months, so 
that he will not miss a good opportunity to buy a summer home. Suppose banks 
are offering interest rates of 3 percent per year. Would you charge him interest 
on the loan?
Response Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
1) Yes 8.7 33.2 6 29
2) No 91.3 66.8 94 71
N: 127 214 117 111
A8. If you went on a vacation with friends and there were a lot of shared
expenses, would there be a careful accounting of who spent what and a settling 
of accounts afterwards?
Response Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
1) Yes 66.4 81.8 30 47
2) No 33.6 18.2 70 53
N; 125 214 116 118
A9. A new railway line makes travel between city and summer homes positioned 
along this rail line substantially easier. Accordingly, summer homes along this
railway become more desirable, 
there?
Is it fair if rents are raised on summer homes
Response
1) Yes
2) No
N:
Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A
36.8 62.9 57 61
63.2 37.1 43 39
125 213 98 115
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B2. On a holiday, when there is a great demand for flowers, their prices usually 
go up. Is it fair for flower sellers to raise their prices like this?
Response
1) Yes
2) No
N:
Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
29.4 23.9 34 32
70.6 76.1 66 68
126 209 131 119
B3. Should the government introduce limits on the increase in prices of flowers, 
even if it might produce a shortage of flowers?
Response
1) Yes
2) No
N:
Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
50.4 66.8 54 28
49.6 33.2 46 72
125 211 123 115
B4. Which of the following achievements would please you more? [Response 
choices: 1) You win fortune without fame: you make enough money through
successful business dealings so that you can live very comfortably for the rest of 
your life; 2) You win fame without fortune: for example you win a medal at the 
Olympics or you become a respected journalist or scholar.]
Response Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
1 51.6 56 65 54
2 48.4 44 35 46
N: 124 209 92 117
B6. If the price of coffee on the world market suddenly increased by 30 percent, 
what do you think is likely to be the blame? [Response choices: 1) Interventions 
of some government: 2) Such things as bad harvest in Brazil or unexpected 
changes in demand; 3) Speculators’ efforts to raise prices.]
Response Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
1 18.9 36.4 17 13
2 27.9 20.2 51 36
3 53.3 43.4 32 51
N: 122 198 109 111
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B7. You are standing in long line to buy something. You see that someone 
comes to the line and is very distressed that the line is so long, saying he is in a 
great hurry and absolutely must make this purchase. A person at the front of the 
line offers to let him take his place in line for $10.00. Would you be annoyed at 
this deal even though it won’t cause you to wait any longer?
Response
1) Yes
2) No
N;
Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
63.2 34.5 69 44
36.8 65.5 31 56
125 206 132 117
B8. How likely is it, from your point of view, that the government in the next few 
years will take measures, in one way or another, to prevent those who have 
saved a great deal from making use of their savings? Is it quite likely, possible, 
unlikely, or impossible that the government will do this? [Response choices: 1) 
Quite likely; 2) Possible; 3) Unlikely; 4) Impossible.]
Response Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
1 16.3 5.7 17 15
2 22.0 14.7 44 37
3 30.1 26.5 21 39
4 31.7 53.1 19 9
N: 123 211 112 117
BIO. Suppose that economists have come to the
substantially improve our standard of living in the next year if we would be willing 
to accept a 30-per-cent inflation rate (increase in the prices of goods by 30 
percent). This would mean that our incomes would rise by more than 30 
percent. Then we could buy more goods at the new higher prices. Would you 
support such a proposal?
Response Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A
1) Yes 36.6 58.2 47 28
2) No 63.4 41.8 53 72
N; 123 194 118 115
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B11. A small factory produces kitchen tables and sells them at $200 each. 
There is so much demand for the tables that it cannot meet it fully. The factory 
decides to raise the price of its tables by $20, when there was no change in the 
costs of producing tables. Is this fair?
Response Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
1) Yes 25.4 30.3 34 30
2) No 74.6 69.7 66 70
N; 126 208 131 120
B12. Apart from fairness, should the factory have the right to raise price in this 
situation?
Response
1) Yes
2) No
N;
Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
31.5 31.1 57 59
68.5 68.9 43 41
124 209 118 118
Cl. Suppose that as a result of successful business dealings you unexpectedly 
became rich. How do you imagine it would be received by your relatives at a 
holiday family meeting? Would they congratulate you and show great interest, or 
would they be judgmental and contemptuous? [Response choices: 1) They
would show interest, would congratulate; 2) They would be judgmental and 
contemptuous; 3) They would be quiet indifferent.]
Response Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
1 65.3 30.3 72 92
2 16.1 53.6 12 6
3 18.5 16.1 16 3
N; 124 211 113 117
C2. If you ever became rich, would you really like to
by purchasing really fashionable clothes, 
items that make an impression on people?
expensive
Response Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
1) Yes 23.8 46 35 50
2) No 76.2 54 65 50
N: 122 213 115 120
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C3. Which of the following qualities is more important for the manager of a 
company? /Response Choices; 1) The manager must show good will in his 
relation to workers and win their friendship; 2) The manager must be a strict 
enforcer of work discipline, giving incentives to hard workers and punishing 
laggards.]
Response
1
2
N;
Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
42.6 28.4 33 49
57.4 71 68 51
122 215 112 109
C4. Suppose that the government wishes to reduce consumption of gasoline. 
They propose two methods of attaining this goal. First, the government could 
prohibit gas stations from selling, for example, more than five gallons to one 
person. Second, the government could put a tax on gasoline, and prices of 
gasoline would go up. From your point of view, which of these methods is 
better?
Response
1) First
2) Second
N;
Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A
50.4 63.5 43 36
49.6 36.5 57 64
119 208 104 109
C5. Do you think that those who try to make a lot of money will often turn out to 
be not very honest people?
Response Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
1) Yes 45.8 46.7 59 39
2) No 54.2 53.3 41 62
N; 118 214 114 117
C6. Suppose the price of electricity rises fourfold, from 10 cents per kilowatt hour 
to 40 cents per kilowatt hour. No other prices change. Suppose also that at the 
same time your monthly income increases by exactly enough to pay for the extra 
cost of electricity without cutting back on any of your other expenditures. Please 
evaluate how your overall material well-being has changed. Would you consider 
your situation: 1) Somewhat better off; 2) Exactly the same; 3) Somewhat 
worse off?
Response Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
1 4.2 20.4 9 3
2 54.2 60.2 77 63
3 41.7 19.4 14 34
N; 120 186 120 121
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C7. How likely do you think it is that in the next few years the government will, in 
some way, nationalize (that is, take over) most private businesses with little or no 
compensation to the owners? Is such nationalization quite likely, possible, 
unlikely, or impossible? [Response choices: 1) Quite likely; 2) Possible; 3) 
Unlikely; 4) Impossible.]
Response Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
1 9.3 4.2 20 5
2 15.3 7.0 40 11
3 34.7 22.8 29 53
4 40.7 66.0 11 31
N; 118 215 114 118
C8. Grain traders in capitalist countries sometimes hold grain without selling it, 
putting it in temporary storage in anticipation of higher prices later. Do you think 
this “speculation" will cause more frequent shortages of flour, bread, and other 
grain products? Or will it cause such shortages to become rarer? [Response 
choices; 1) Shortages more common; 2) Shortages less common; 3) No effect 
on shortages.]
Response Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
1 35.3 67.6 45 66
2 16.0 17.2 31 26
3 48.7 15.1 24 8
N: 119 186 110 112
C9. Do you think that, if you worked independently today as a businessman and 
received profit, your friends and acquaintances would respect you less and not 
treat you as you deserve?
Response Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A.
1) Yes 21.8 21.6 19 4
2) No 78.2 78.4 81 96
N; 119 208 115 120
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C^0. A small merchant company buys vegetables from some rural people, brings 
the vegetables to the city, and sells them, making from this a large profit. The 
company honestly and openly tells the rural people what it is doing, and these 
people freely sell the company the vegetables at the agreed price. Is this 
behavior of the company, making large profits using the rural people, acceptable 
from moral point of view?
Response Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A
1) Yes 42.9 66.7 49 59
2) No 57.1 33.3 51 41
N: 119 207 120 116
C11. Do you think that it is likely to be difficult to make friends with people who 
have their own business (individual or small corporation) and are trying to make 
a profit?
Response Turkey Iran Russia U.S.A
1) Yes 32.2 46.6 51 20
2) No 67.8 53.4 50 80
N: 118 206 111 121
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Appendix II
Survey Results for Turkey:
24 Jun 97 SPSS for M S W IN D O W S R elease 5.0
A1
Value Label Value Frequency
Valid
Percent Percent
Cum
Percent
,00 18 14,2 14,3 14,3
1,00 108 85,0 85,7 100,0
» 1 ,8 Missing
Total 127 100,0 100,0
Valid cases 126 Missing cases 1
A2
Value Frequency
Valid
Percent Percent
Cum
Percent
1,00 26 20,5 20,6 20,6
2,00 48 37,8 38,1 58,7
3,00 52 40,9 41,3 100,0
» 1 ,8 Missing
Total 127 100,0 100,0
Valid cases 126 Missing cases 1
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A3
Valid Cum
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
,00 78 61,4 63,9 63,9
1,00 44 34,6 36,1 100,0
> 5 3,9 Missing
Total 127 100,0 100,0
Valid cases 122 Missing cases 5
A4
Value Label
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
.00 90 70,9 73,2 73,2
1,00 33 26,0 26,8 100,0
- 4 3,1 Missing
Total 127 100,0 100,0
Valid cases 123 Missing cases 4
A5
Value Label
Total
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
1,00 95 74,8 74,8 74,8
2,00 26 20,5 20,5 95,3
3,00 6 4,7 4,7 100,0
i 127 100,0 100,0
Valid cases 127 Missing cases 0
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A7
Value Label
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
,00 116 91,3 91,3 91,3
1,00 11 8.7 8,7 100,0
Total 127 100,0 100,0
Valid cases 127 Missing cases 0
A8
Value Label Value Frequency
Valid
Percent Percent
Cum
Percent
.00 42 33,1 33,6 33,6
1,00 83 65,4 66,4 100,0
I 2 1,6 Missing
il 127 100,0 100,0
Valid cases 125 Missing cases 2
A9
Valid Cum
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
,00 79 62,2 63,2 63,2
1,00 46 36,2 36,8 100,0
2 1,6 Missing
Total 127 100,0 100,0
Valid cases 125 Missing cases 2
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B2
Value Label
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
,00 89 70,1 70,6 70,6
1,00 37 29,1 29,4 100,0
» 1 ,8 Missing
Total 127 100,0 100,0
Valid cases 126 Missing cases 1
B3
Valid Cum
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
,00 62 48,8 49,6 49,6
1,00 63 49,6 50,4 100,0
1 2 1,6 Missing
127 100,0 100,0
Valid cases 125 Missing cases 2
B4
Value Label
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
1,00
2,00
64
60
3
Total 127
Valid cases 124 Missing cases
50.4 51,6 51,6
47,2 48,4 100,0
2.4 Missing
100,0 100,0
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B6
Value Label
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
1,00 23 18,1 18,9 18,9
2,00 34 26,8 27,9 46,7
3,00 65 51,2 53,3 100,0
1 5 3,9 Missing
Total 127 100,0 100,0
Valid cases 122 Missing cases 5
B7
Value Label Value Frequency
Valid
Percent Percent
Cum
Percent
,00 46 36,2 36,8 36,8
1,00 79 62,2 63,2 100,0
j 2 1,6 Missing
Total 127 100,0 100,0
Valid cases 125 Missing cases 2
B8
Value Label Value Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cum
Percent
1,00 20 15,7 16,3 16,3
2,00 27 21,3 22,0 38,2
3,00 37 29,1 30,1 68,3
4,00 39 30,7 31,7 100,0
- 4 3,1 Missing
il 127 100,0 100,0
Valid cases
Tota
123 Missing cases
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B10
Value Label
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
00 78
1,00 45
4
Total 127
Valid cases 123 Missing cases
61.4 63,4 63,4
35.4 36,6 100,0
3,1 Missing
100,0 100,0
B11
Value Label
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
B12
.00 94 74,0 74,6 74,6
1,00 32 25,2 25,4 100,0
' 1 ,8 Missing
Total 127 100,0 100,0
Valid cases 126 Missing cases 1
Valid Cum
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
,00 85 66,9 68,5 68,5
1,00 39 30,7 31,5 100,0
3 2,4 Missing
Total 127 100,0 100,0
Valid cases 124 Missing cases 3
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Cl
Value Label
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
1,00 81 63,8 65,3 65,3
2,00 20 15,7 16,1 81,5
3,00 23 18,1 18,5 100,0
, 3 2,4 Missing
Total 127
Valid cases 124 Missing cases
100,0 100,0
C2
Value Label
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
,00 93 73,2 76,2 76,2
1,00 29 22,8 23,8 100,0
' 5 3,9 Missing
3l 127 100,0 100,0
Valid cases 122 Missing cases 5
C3
Value Label
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
1,00 52 40,9 42,6 42,6
2,00 70 55,1 57,4 100,0
» 5 3,9 Missing
al 127 100,0 100,0
Valid cases 122 Missing cases 5
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C4
Valid Cum
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
1,00 60 47,2 50,4 50,4
2,00 59 46,5 49,6 100,0
- 8 6,3 Missing
Total 127 100,0 100,0
Valid cases 119 Missing cases 8
C5
Valid Cum
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
,00 64 50,4 54,2 54,2
1,00 54 42,5 45,8 100,0
I 9 7,1 Missing
Total 127 100,0 100,0
Valid cases 118 Missing cases 9
C6
Value Label Value Frequency Percent
Valid Cum 
Percent Percent
1,00 5 3,9 4,2 4,2
2,00 65 51,2 54,2 58,3
3,00 50 39,4 41,7 100,0
» 7 5,5 Missing
il 127 100,0 100,0
Valid cases 120 Missing cases 7
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C7
Value Label
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
1,00 11 8,7 9.3 9,3
2,00 18 14.2 15,3 24,6
3,00 41 32,3 34,7 59,3
4,00 48 37,8 40,7 100,0
» 9 7,1 Missing
Total 127 100,0 100,0
Valid cases 118 Missing cases 9
C8
Value Label
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
1,00 42 33,1 35,3 35,3
2,00 19 15,0 16,0 51,3
3,00 58 45,7 48,7 100,0
j 8 6,3 Missing
Valid cases
Total 127 
119 Missing cases
100,0 100,0
C9
Valid Cum
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
.00 93 73,2 78,2 78,2
1,00 26 20,5 21,8 100,0
» 8 6,3 Missing
Total 127 100,0 100,0
Valid cases 119 Missing cases 8
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C10
Value Label
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
,00 68 53,5 57,1 57,1
1,00 51 40,2 42,9 100,0
' 8 6,3 Missing
3l 127 100,0 100,0
Valid cases 119 Missing cases 8
C11
Value Label Value Frequency
Valid
Percent Percent
Cum
Percent
.00 80 63,0 67,8 67,8
1,00 38 29,9 32,2 100,0
9 7,1 Missing
il 127 100,0 100,0
Valid cases 118 Missing cases 9
SEX
Valid Cum
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
female ,00 45 35,4 35,4 35,4
male 1,00 82 64,6 64,6 100,0
Total 127 100,0 100,0
Valid cases 127 Missing cases 0
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EDUCATION
Valid Cum
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
primary 1,00 11 8,7 8,7 8,7
secondary 2,00 10 7,9 7,9 16,5
high school 3,00 57 44,9 44,9 61,4
university 4,00 49 38,6 38,6 100,0
Total 127 100,0 100,0
Valid cases 127 Missing cases 0
OCCUPATION
Valid Cum
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
student 1,00 13 10,2 10,2 10,2
out of market 2,00 13 10,2 10,2 20,5
retired 3,00 8 6,3 6.3 26,8
working 4,00 93 73,2 73,2 100,0
Total 127 100,0 100,0
Valid cases 127 Missing cases 0
MARITAL STATUS
Valid Cum
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Perce
single .00 47 37,0 37,0 37,0
engaged 1,00 1 .8 ,8 37,8
married 2,00 79 62,2 62,2 100,0
Total 127 100,0 100,0
Valid cases 127 Missing cases 0
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REGION
Valid Cum
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Keçiören 1,00 38 29,9 29,9 29,9
Y.Mahalle 2,00 39 30,7 30,7 60,6
Çankaya 3,00 50 39,4 39,4 100,0
Total 127 100,0 100,0
Valid cases 127 Missing cases 0
AGE
Mean 32.82
Valid cases 127
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Appendix III 
Contingency Tables
A1
TURKEY
IRAN
RUSSIA
USA
TOTAL
N %Y %N OY ON EY EN DEV. Y DEV. N TOTAL
126 85.7 14.3 108 18 108 18 3E-06 1.8E-05 2.IE-05
215 83.3 16.7 179 36 184 31 0.146205 0.877231 1.023436
121 90 10 109 12 104 17 0.259286 1.555714 1.815
119 86 14 102 17 102 17 0.001133 0.0068 0.007933
581 498 83 498 83 2.84639
A2 N %1 %2 %3 01 02 03 El E2 E3 DEV. 1 DEV. 2 DEV.3 TOTAL
TURKEY 126 20.6 38.1 41.3 26 48 52 27 43 56 0.023768 0.54632 0.293542 0.86363
IRAN 213 19.7 27.2 53.1 42 58 113 45 73 95 0.235714 3.088294 3.521585 6.845593
RUSSIA 125 38 39 23 48 49 29 27 43 56 16.55077 0.824719 13.00338 30.37887
USA 120 7 38 55 8 46 66 25 41 53 11.44874 0.49365 2.960042 14.90243
TOTAL 584 124 200 260 124 200 260 52.99053
AS N %Y %N OY ON EY EN DEV. Y DEV. N TOTAL
TURKEY 122 36.1 63.9 44 78 41 81 0.170057 0.087314 0.257371
IRAN 215 27 73 58 157 73 142 3.039507 1.560607 4.600114
RUSSIA 110 41 59 45 65 37 73 1.622824 0.833224 2.456049
USA 116 38 62 44 72 39 77 0.567679 0.29147 0.859149
TOTAL 563 191 372 191 372 8.172683
A4 N %Y %N OY ON EY EN DEV. Y DEV. N TOTAL
TURKEY 123 26.8 73.2 33 90 54 69 8.201636 6.421018 14.62265
IRAN 206 51 49 105 101 90 116 2.35725 1.845479 4.202729
RUSSIA 114 55 45 63 51 50 64 3.192108 2.499084 5.691192
USA 99 38 62 38 61 43 56 0.787851 0.616804 1.404655
TOTAL 542 238 304 238 304 25.92123
A5 N %1 %2 %S 01 02 OS E1 E2 ES
TURKEY 127 74.8 20.5 4.7 95 26 6 68 40 20
IRAN 213 38.5 33.8 27.7 82 72 59 114 67 33
RUSSIA 130 69 25 6 90 33 8 69 41 20
USA 119 40 45 15 48 54 18 63 37 18
TOTAL 589 314 184 91 314 184 91
A7 N %Y %N OY ON EY EN DEV. Y DEV. N TOTAL
TURKEY 127 8.7 91.3 11 116 27 100 9.429349 2.546766 11.97612
IRAN 214 33.2 66.8 71 143 46 168 14.33369 3.871376 18.20507
RUSSIA 117 6 94 7 110 25 92 12.82118 3.462862 16.28404
USA 111 29 71 32 79 24 87 3.122684 0.843404 3.966088
TOTAL 569 121 448 121 448 50.43131
DEVI
11.00105
8.764279
6.002558
3.954888
DEV2
4.688785
0.447059
1.620037
7.213066
DEVS
9.499214
20.68863
7.514033
0.015591
TOTAL
25.18905
29.89997
15.13663
11.18354
81.40919
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A8 N %Y %N OY ON EY
TURKEY 125 66.4 33.6 83 42 76
IRAN 214 81.8 18.2 175 39 130
RUSSIA 116 30 70 35 81 70
USA 118 47 53 55 63 72
TOTAL 573 348 225 348
49
84
46
46
225
0.660989
15.6385
18.04026
3.664268
1.02233
24.18755
27.90227
5.667401
1.683319
39.82606
45.94253
9.331669
96.78358
A9 N %Y %N OY ON EY
TURKEY 125 36.8 63.2 46 79 69
IRAN 213 62.9 37.1 134 79 118
RUSSIA 98 57 43 56 42 54
USA 115 61 39 70 45 64
TOTAL 551 306 245 306
56
95
44
51
245
7.900702
2.08022
0.037853
0.618367
9.867815
2.598152
0.047278
0.772328
17.76852
4.678372
0.085131
1.390695
23.92271
B2
TURKEY
IRAN
RUSSIA
USA
TOTAL
N %Y %N OY ON EY EN DEV. Y DEV. N TOTAL
126
209
131
119
585
29.4
23.9
34
32
70.6
76.1
66
68
37 
50 
45
38 
170
89
159
86
81
415
37 
61
38 
35
89
148
93
84
0.005017
1.914802
1.100176
0.353997
0.002055
0.784377
0.450675
0.145011
170 415
0.007073
2.699179
1.550851
0.499007
4.756109
B3 N %Y %N OY ON EY EN DEV. Y DEV. N TOTAL
TURKEY 125 50.4 49.6 63 62 66 59 0.134974 0.150912 0.285886
IRAN 211 66.8 33.2 141 70 111 100 7.848482 8.77524 16.62372
RUSSIA 123 54 46 66 57 65 58 0.034259 0.038304 0.072562
USA 115 28 72 32 83 61 54 13.38539 14.96595 28.35134
TOTAL 574 303 271 303 271 45.33351
B4 N %1 %2 01 02 El El DEV. 1 DEV. 2 TOTAL
TURKEY 124 51.6 48.4 64 60 70 54 0.445412 0.568929 1.014341
IRAN 209 56 44 117 92 117 92 0.000292 0.000373 0.000666
RUSSIA 92 65 35 60 32 52 40 1.302594 1.663818 2.966413
USA 117 54 46 63 54 66 51 0.090993 0.116226 0.207218
TOTAL 542 304 238 304 238 4.188637
B6 N %1 %2 %3 01 02 03 El E2 E3 DEV. 1 DEV. 2 DEV.3 TOTAL
TURKEY 122 18.9 27.9 53.3 23 34 65 29 38 55 1.187671 0.497084 1.960022 3.644777
IRAN 198 36.4 20.2 43.4 72 40 86 47 62 89 13.4649 8.004649 0.088439 21.55799
RUSSIA 109 17 51 32 19 56 35 26 34 49 2.066521 13.19061 3.994198 19.25133
USA 111 13 36 51 14 40 57 26 35 50 5.365064 0.71988 0.94756 7.032504
TOTAL 540 128 170 242 128 170 242 51.4866
B7 N %Y %N OY ON EY EN DEV. Y DEV. N TOTAL
TURKEY 125 63.2 36.8 79 46 63 62 3.980135 4.063344 8.043479
IRAN 206 34.5 65.5 71 135 104 102 10.46172 10.68043 21.14215
RUSSIA 132 69 31 91 41 67 65 8.926226 9.112837 18.03906
USA 117 44 56 51 66 59 58 0.983725 1.004291 1.988016
TOTAL 580 293 :287 293 287 49.21271
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B8 N %1 %2 %3 %4 01 02 03 04 El E2 E3 E4 DEVI DEV2 DEV3 DEV4 TOTAL
TURKEY 123 16. 22 30. 31. 2 0 27 37 39 15 33 35 40 1.64148 1.065711 0.075112 0.0201 2.802403
IRAN 2 1 1 5.7 14. 26. 53.
7 c; 1
1 2 31 56 1 1 2 26 57 61 68 7.399281 11.55746 0.379331 28.16601 47.50209
RUSSIA 1 1 2
1 0 1 
17 44 21 18 19 49 24 2 0 14 30 32 36 2.056877 12.32438 2.352598 7.111393 23.84525
USA 117 15 37 39 9 18 43 46 11 14 31 34 38 0.718928 4.520238 4.251625 19.694 29.18479
TOTAL 563 69 151 162 182 69 151 162 182 103.3345
B10 N %Y %N OY ON EY
TURKEY 123 36.6 63.4 45 78 55
IRAN 194 58.2 41.8 113 81 87
RUSSIA 118 47 53 55 63 53
USA 115 28 72 32 83 51
TOTAL 550 246 304 246
B11 N %Y %N OY ON EY
TURKEY 126 25.4 74.6 32 94 38
IRAN 208 30.3 69.7 63 145 63
RUSSIA 131 34 66 45 86 39
USA 120 30 70 36 84 36
TOTAL 585 176 409 176
B12 N %Y %N OY ON EY
TURKEY 124 31.5 68.5 39 85 53
IRAN 209 31.1 68.9 65 144 89
RUSSIA 118 57 43 67 51 50
USA 118 59 41 70 48 50
68
107
65
64
304
88
145
92
84
TOTAL 569 241 328 241
71
120
68
68
328
1.816445
7.873002
0.136271
7.194087
1.469887
6.370916
0.110272
5.821531
3.286332
14.24392
0.246543
13.01562
30.79241
0.919433 0.395648 1.315081 
0.003182 0.001369 0.004551 
0.667227 0.28712 0.954347
0.000291 0.000125 0.000417 
2.274396
3.449668 2.534664 5.984332 
6.250765 4.592788 10.84355 
5.975241 4.390345 10.36559 
7.718704 5.671365 13.39007 
40.58354
C1 N %1 %2 %3 01 02 03 El E2 E3 DEV. 1 DEV. 2 DEV.3 TOTAL
TURKEY 124 65.3 16.1 18.5 81 20 23 73 34 17 0.802411 5.662602 1.809996 8.275009
IRAN 211 30.3 53.6 16.1 64 113 34 125 58 30 29.63623 53.72205 0.676756 84.03504
RUSSIA 113 72 12 16 81 14 18 67 31 16 3.173557 9.649922 0.329013 13.15249
USA 117 92 6 3 108 7 4 69 32 16 21.40338 19.39558 10.09239 50.89134
TOTAL 565 334 154 79 334 154 79 156.3539
C2 N %Y %N OY ON EY EN DEV. Y DEV. N TOTAL
TURKEY 122 23.8 76.2 29 93 49 73 7.866492 5.206104 13.0726
IRAN 213 46 54 98 115 85 128 2.03969 1.349882 3.389573
RUSSIA 115 35 65 40 75 46 69 0.672144 0.44483 1.116974
USA 120 50 50 60 60 48 72 3.11987 2.064754 5.184624
TOTAL 570 227 343 227 343 22.76377
C3 N %1 %2 01 02 El El DEV. 1 DEV. 2 TOTAL
TURKEY 122 42.6 57.4 52 70 44 78 1.297444 0.741919 2.039363
IRAN 215 28.4 71.6 61 154 78 137 3.76335 2.152 5.91535
RUSSIA 112 33 67 37 75 41 71 0.351699 0.201112 0.552811
USA 109 49 51 53 56 40 69 4.771867 2.728701 7.500568
TOTAL 558 203 355 203 355 16.00809
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C4
TURKEY
IRAN
RUSSIA
USA
TOTAL
%1 %2 01 02 El El DEV. 1 DEV. 2 TOTAL
119
208
104
109
540
50.4
63.5 
43 
36
49.6
36.5
57
64
60
132
45
39
276
59
76
59
70
264
61
106
53
56
276
58
102
51
53
264
0.011774
6.246155
1.338686
4.86972
0.012309
6.530071
1.399535
5.091071
0.024082
12.77623
2.738221
9.960791
25.49932
C5
TURKEY
IRAN
RUSSIA
USA
TOTAL
N %Y %N OY ON EY EN DEV. Y DEV. N TOTAL
118 45.8 54.2 54 64 56 62 0.065664 0.05923 0.124894
214 46.7 53.3 100 114 101 113 0.023687 0.021366 0.045052
114 59 41 67 47 54 60 3.220925 2.905362 6.126287
117 39 61 46 71 55 62 1.750945 1.5794 3.330344
563 267 296 267 296 9.626577
C6 N %1 %2 %3 01 02 03 E1 E2 E3 DEV. 1 DEV. 2 DEV.3 TOTAL
TURKEY 120 4.2 54.2 41.7 5 65 50 13 76 32 4.455956 1.555193 10.7749 16.78604
IRAN 186 20.4 60.2 19.4 38 112 36 19 118 49 17.77645 0.27428 3.388667 21.4394
RUSSIA 120 9 77 14 11 92 17 13 76 32 0.23236 3.584578 6.924827 10.74176
USA 121 3 63 34 4 76 41 13 77 32 6.393833 0.001235 2.7072 9.102269
TOTAL 547 57 346 144 57 346 144 58.06948
C7 N %1 %2 %3 %4 01 02 03 04 El E2 E3 E4 DEVI DEV2 DEV3 DEV4 TOTAL
TURKEY 118 9.3 15. 34.7 40.7 11 18 41 48 10 19 39 50 0.053564 0.070051 0.113523 0.071491 0.308629
IRAN 215 4.2 7 22.8 66 9 15 49 142 19 35 71 91 4.959118 11.37871 6.689064 28.54653 51.57342
RUSSIA 114 20 40 29 11 23 46 33 13 10 19 38 48 16.86632 39.38022 0.53222 26.40393 83.18269
USA 118 5 11 53 31 6 13 63 37 10 19 39 50 1.835159 2.022714 14.45206 3.562521 21.87245
TOTAL 565 49 92 186 239 49 92 186 239 156.9372
C8 N %1 %2 %3 01 02 03 E1 E2 E3 DEV. 1 DEV. 2 DEV.3 TOTAL
TURKEY 119 35.3 16 48.7 42 19 58 66 26 27 8.549987 1.744855 34.33873 44.63357
IRAN 186 67.6 17.2 15.1 126 32 28 103 40 43 5.164128 1.688863 5.004954 11.85794
RUSSIA 110 45 31 24 50 34 26 61 24 25 2.079986 4.462759 0.051803 6.594549
USA 112 66 26 8 74 29 9 62 24 26 2.357854 0.9879 10.9173 14.26305
TOTAL 527 291 114 121 291 114 121 77.34912
C9 N %Y %N OY ON EY EN DEV. Y DEV. N TOTAL
TURKEY 119 21.8 78.2 26 93 21 98 1.298625 0.274279 1.572904
IRAN 208 21.6 78.4 45 163 36 172 2.066501 0.436459 2.50296
RUSSIA 115 19 81 22 93 20 95 0.160962 0.033996 0.194959
USA 120 4 96 5 115 21 99 12.42633 2.624526 15.05085
TOTAL 562 98 464 98 464 19.32168
CIO N %Y %N OY ON EY EN DEV. Y DEV. N TOTAL
TURKEY 119 42.9 57.1 51 68 67 52 3.759329 4.829057 8.588387
IRAN 207 66.7 33.3 138 69 116 91 4.037373 5.186219 9.223593
RUSSIA 120 49 51 59 61 67 53 1.114905 1.432154 2.547058
USA 116 59 41 68 48 65 51 0.158551 0.203667 0.362219
TOTAL 562 316 246 316 246 20.72126
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C11 N %Y %N OY ON EY EN DEV. Y DEV. N TOTAL
TURKEY 118 32.2 67.8 38 80 46 72 1.277031 0.805166 2.082197
IRAN 206 46.6 53.4 96 110 80 126 3.35083 2.112693 5.463523
RUSSIA 111 51 49 57 54 43 68 4.364669 2.751918 7.116587
USA 121 20 80 24 97 47 74 10.90603 6.876238 17.78227
TOTAL 556 215 341 215 341 32.44458
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NOTES
' See Habibi 1995 page 3.
■ See Shiller et al. 1991 page 385.
 ^See Habibi (1995) page 7.
See Habibi 1995 page 7.
 ^See Douglass North, In stitu tion s, In s titu tio n a l C h a n g e  a n d  E co n o m ic  P erfo rm a n ce  
 ^See Hans Aage, 1991, page 3.
’ For the figures and information provided in this section see 
OECD Economic Surveys, Turkey, 1995
Recent Developments in Turkish Economy, The Central Bank of Turkey, 1995 
Toksoz, M., EIU Special Report No. 1136, 1988 
* See Mina Toksoz 1988 page 11.
 ^See Sakip Sabanci, Turkey: C h a n g in g  a n d  D e v e lo p in g , page 53.
See Sakip Sabanci, T urkey: C h a n g in g  a n d  D e v e lo p in g , page 53.
“ See OECD Economic Surveys, Turkey, 1995, pages 26-27.
'■ See Habibi, 1995, pages 8-10.
See Habibi 1995 for figures on Iran, USSR, and USA.
For each question, a chi-square test is used to determine whether the variables in 
the contingency table are independent or dependent. A contingency table 
displays one variable on the row and the other on the column. A finding of 
independence would mean that the variable on the row (country 
where the survey was implemented) and the variable on the column (response 
choice) are independent.
The Hypothesis for a test of statistical independence are:
H q =  the variables are independent 
=  the variables are dependent 
O = observed frequency
E = expected frequency
x\TS) = i^ { 0 - e Y
d.f = (no. rows - l)(no. columns - 1)
Reject H q if Chi-square(TS) > Chi-square(cut-off) 
See Shiller et al. 1991, page 389.
See Dindi et al. 1989, page 389.
See Shiller et al. 1991, page 392.
See Shiller et al. 1991, page 390.
79
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Aage, Hans, “Popular Attitudes and Perestroika,” Soviet Studies, 1991,vol 43, 
no.1, pp.3-25.
2. Akural, S., Turkic Culture, Indiana University Turkish Studies 6, 1987.
3. Aricanli, T. and Rodrik, D., The Political Economy of Turkey, St. Martin’s 
Press, New York, 1990.
4. Bainbridge, W., Survey Research: A Computer-Assisted Introduction, 
Wadsworth Publishing Company, Belmont, California, 1989.
5. de Vaus, D. A., Surveys in Social Research, Fourth Edition, UCL Press, 
London, 1996.
6. Dindi, H., Gazur, M., Gazur, W. and Kirkkopru-Dindi, A., Turkish Culture for 
Americans, International Concepts Ltd., Boulder, Colorado, USA, 1989.
7. Elster, Jon, “Social Norms and Economic Theory,” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Fall 1989, pp.99-117.
8. Fe^-nandez, R. And Rodrik, D., “Resistance to Reform; Status Quo Bias in the 
Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty,” The American Economic 
Review, 1991, vol.81, no.5, pp.1146-1155.
9. Furnham, A. and Lewis, A., The Economic Mind, St. Martins Press, New 
York, 1986.
10. Habibi, Nader, “Popular Attitudes Toward Free Markets in Iran, Former 
Soviet Union and the United States: A Survey Analysis,” Institute for 
Research in Planning and Development, Tehran, Iran, May 1995.
11. ISSP International Social Survey Programme, Attitudes to Inequality and the 
Role of Government, Social and Cultural Planning Office, Netherlands, 1990.
12. Kahneman, D., Knetsch, Jack L. and Thaler, R., “Fairness as a Constraint on 
Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market,” American Economic Review, 
September 1986, vol.76, pp.728-741.
80
13. OECD Economic Surveys, Turkey, 1995
14. North, Douglass C., Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance, Cambridge University Press, 1990.
15. Recent Developments in Turkish Economy, The Central Bank of The 
Republic of Turkey, June 1995.
16. Sabanci, S., Turkey: Changing and Developing.
17. Shiffler, R. and Adams, A., Introductory Business Statistics with Computer 
Applications, Duxbury Press, 1995.
18. Shiller, R., Boycko, M. and Korobov, V., “Popular Attitudes Toward Free 
Markets; The Soviet Union and The United States Compared,” The American 
Economic Review, 1991, vol.81, no.3, pp.385-400.
19. Toksoz, Mina, “Turkey to 1992; Missing Another Chance?” The Economist 
Intelligence Unit Economic Prospects Series, Special Report No. 1136, 1988.
20. Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D., “Rational Choice and the Framing of 
Decisions,” in Rational Choice: The Contrast between Economics and 
Psychology, ed. Robin M. Flogarth and Melvin W. Reder, University of 
Chicago Press, 1987.
81
